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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
unhampered power to convert? In the instant case the court declares that were
the federal act construed to give state building and loan associations unrestricted
power to convert it would result in a violation of the rights of stockholders and
an unauthorized invasion of state rights. However the court, by construing the
federal act as permissive only was not required to answer this question.
It is suggested that this act confers power of conversion as does the national
banking act. State banks may convert without the consent of the state. Casey v.
Galli, 94 U.S. 673, 24 L.Ed. 168 (1876). The court holds that this federal power
applies only to banks; that building and loan associations are not banks. Can it
be said that the functions of these two types of corporations are so different, or
the control of the state so absolute, as to deny application of this federal power?
Is the conversion a sufficiently radical change in the functions and purposes of
the corporation to constitute a violation of the rights of stockholders? The build-
ing and loan associations are seeking a review.of the case before the United
States Supreme Court.
RICHARD B. JOHNs.
INSURANCE-PRESUMPTION OF DEATH AFTER SEVEN YEARS ABSENcE-DILIGENT
SEARcH.-Plaintiff beneficiary brought an action on three insurance policies is-
sued by the defendant and showed that the insured, her husband, disappeared on
his way to work and has not been heard from for over seven years prior to the
commencement of this action. The insured had lived in domestic tranquility with
his wife, was not a wanderer, and followed an almost invariable daily routine.
After ascertaining that the insured did not appear for work on the day of his
disappearance, the plaintiff made no inquiry at police headquarters but wrote
letters to the insured's mother and sister and received no reply. The defendant
appeals from a judgment awarding the plaintiff the face value of the policies
and also the premiums paid since the day of the insured's disappearance on the
ground that there was no showing of diligent search to discover the death or
whereabouts of the insured. Held, the evidence is sufficient to establish the infer-
ence that the insured died on the day of his disappearance; death will be
presumed without a showing of a diligent search. Delaney v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., (Wis. 1934) 257 N.W. 140.
The first case in Wisconsin on this point involved the presumption of death
of one absent for twenty-one years, Cowan v. Lindsay, 30 Wis. 586 (1872), and
Greenleaf's rule that seven years absence without tidings shifts the burden of
proof to the party contesting the presumption was regarded as sufficient author-
ity. The inference in the Cowan case, supra, that diligent search by the party
seeking to establish the presumption is not necessary was followed for some time.
Miller v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 140 Wis. 505, 122 N.W. 1126,
133 Am. St. Rep. 1095, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 178, (1909) ; Page v. Modern Woodmen
of America, 162 Wis. 259, 156 N.W. 137, L.R.A. 1916F 438 (1916); Ewing v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 299, 210 N.W. 819 (1926). Following Green-
leaf's broad statement of the rule led the court into error in the Ewing case, supra,
where seven years absence without tidings established death even though the in-
sured left under circumstances indicating that the plaintiff would never hear
from her again. The unreasonableness of the holding was recognized in Hansen
v. Central Verein, etc., 198 Wis. 140, 223 N.W. 571, 64 A.L.R. 1284 (1929) and
the rule was qualified by holding that the circumstances attending the absentee's
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departure should be considered. This modification was affirmed in Egger v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 329, 234 N.W. 328 (1931), but
but neither case mentioned the necessity for diligent search. Cf. Gardner v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, 152 Misc. Rep. 873, 274 N.Y.
Supp. 256 (1934).
In the instant case the court admits that the presence of diligent search
strengthens the inference but holds that because the presumption is one based
on fact the obligation to institute such search can only be imposed upon some
ground of policy. It being true that diligent search is but one measuring stick
used to determine the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to substantiate the
inference, it follows that the omission of the requirement will work no great
harm if other standards are used to maintain sufficiently rigid requirements. It is
submitted, however, that in the later Wisconsin cases the fact of death has been
based on evidence which would not be regarded as sufficient in jurisdictions
requiring diligent search. In White v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 165
Wis. 419, 162 N.W. 441 (1917), cessation of correspondence on the part of the
insured was held sufficient [contra: Armstrong v. Armstrong, 99 N.J. Eq. 19, 132
Atl. 237 (1926)] and in Egger v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra,
death was found after seven years absence even though the insured deserted
his family and told them he was going to England [contra: Jessie M. Talbot,
petitioner, 250 Mass. 517, 146 N.E. 1 (1925)].
In jurisdictions requiring diligent search the proponent of the inference usu-
ally puts forth evidence of soliciting the aid of the police and visiting the
morgues, Wiley v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., et al., 246 Mich. 573,
250 N.W. 313 (1933) ; or making exhaustive inquiries of those likely to hear of
the absentee, Rodskier v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 216 Iowa 121,
248 N.W. 295 (1933) ; and even in some instances, of broadcasting inquiries over
the radio, Fredrickson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 126 Neb. 240, 252
N.W. 802 (1934). None of these means of investigation was employed by the
plaintiff in the instant case.
It seems to be decidedly against the weight of reason to go the step further
and find the death to have occurred shortly after the time of disappearance on
the evidence submitted in the instant case. While there are cases involving prac-
tically the same facts and arriving at the same conclusion, generally, they can
be distinguished. In Johnson v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 163
Mo. App. 728, 147 S.W. 510 (1912) there was a very diligent search justifying
the finding that the insured died shortly after his disappearance. In Sovereign
Camp Woodmnen of the World v. Piper, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 222 S.W. 649, a
statutory provision eliminated the necessity for diligent search.
JOHN L. WADDLrON.
MORTGAGES-UPSET PRICE-CONFIRMATION OF SAL.-The defendants, mort-
gagors of certain real estate purchased for speculation in 1927, defaulted upon
an appreciable portion of the interest and all of the taxes after the purchase
date, though circumstances indicated an ability to pay. The plaintiff, in meager
circumstances and unable to support herself, foreclosed the mortgage, bid the
property in at $65 per front foot, moved for confirmation of the sale and a
deficiency judgment of $631.56. The trial court, denying the motion, confirmed a
sale at an upset price of $75 per front foot and a deficiency of $175. Plaintiff
appeals, asserting a wrongful application of equitable powers by the court. On
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